Benjamin Netanyahu, IDF chief delayed Israel’s response to October 7
At 6:29 a.m. On October 7, Hamas launched about 3,700 rockets and sent roughly 5,600 militants across Israel’s border at 119 points, overrunning dozens of villages and shocking the nation’s leadership.
Command Structure in Crisis
Classified video of the IDF “pit” shows that no senior generals were present when the attacks began. Mid‑level officers shouted over a flood of invasion reports and lacked an overall defense plan.
By 7:30 a.m., the high command understood only around 40 % of the border breaches; that figure rose to about 60 % by 10:00 a.m., even as hundreds of Israelis were killed or taken hostage.
The senior military leaders only began to coordinate the nation’s defense around 1:00 p.m., coinciding with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s first public video.
Delayed Communication Among Leaders
Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and IDF Chief of Staff Lt‑Gen. Herzi Halevi did not speak directly until nearly four hours after the invasion had started.
All three arrived at the Tel Aviv military headquarters around 8:00 a.m. Gallant and Halevi talked on the phone during the drive, but neither called Netanyahu, and the prime minister did not reach out to them.
Netanyahu received updates through his military secretary, Maj‑Gen. Avi Gil, and issued initial orders to seal Israel’s northern and southern borders, deter a possible Hezbollah assault, and prevent Hamas fighters from retreating across the Gaza border.
The first face‑to‑face meeting among the trio occurred between 9:55 a.m. And 10:15 a.m. In the IDF underground situation room, where they expressed shock at the scale of the assault and debated the extent of a reserve call‑up.
Underlying Trust Issues
Political friction preceded the crisis. In 2023, Gallant publicly clashed with Netanyahu over a judicial overhaul, leading to a brief dismissal that was later reversed after mass protests.
Halevi also faced tension, refusing to enforce Netanyahu’s demands on IDF officers who threatened to refuse reserve duty under the same reform.
Intelligence chief Amit Saar had sent four letters warning that internal political turmoil could embolden Hamas, but his final letter arrived on the eve of the war and he later died of cancer in 2026.
Operational Consequences
The Gaza Division’s headquarters was besieged, and its commander, Brig. Gen. Avi Rosenfeld, could not fully convey the severity of the assault, contributing to an underestimation of the crisis.
Even after the leaders finally met, Netanyahu’s understanding of on‑ground events remained limited until the fog cleared after 1:00 p.m.
Analysts suggest that, had the three officials communicated earlier, some tactical adjustments—such as earlier border closures or a different reserve mobilization—might have been possible, though the ultimate impact remains uncertain.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why did Israel’s top officials not speak until hours after the attack?
They were each awakened at different times, travelled separately to headquarters, and initially communicated through staff rather than directly. A breakdown of trust stemming from prior political disputes also delayed direct contact.
What was the state of the IDF high command during the early hours of October 7?
Mid‑level officers managed the response without senior generals present, and the command only gradually became aware of the full scope of border penetrations, knowing roughly 40 % at 7:30 a.m. And 60 % by 10:00 a.m.
How did political tensions affect communication among Netanyahu, Gallant, and Halevi?
Previous clashes over the judicial overhaul created mutual suspicion. Gallant’s brief dismissal and Halevi’s reluctance to enforce reserve‑call policies contributed to a hesitancy to engage promptly, which persisted into the crisis.
What lessons might future crisis management draw from the coordination challenges observed on October 7?