Ukraine War: Why Recognizing New Borders May Be Key to Peace

For four years, since Russian President Vladimir Putin initiated what he termed a “special military operation,” Ukraine and its international supporters have consistently framed their objectives around the principle of territorial integrity. Initially, Western representatives explicitly called for the restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty over all its internationally recognised territory, including Crimea and parts of the Donbas region under Russian control since 2014. However, this ambition proved unrealistic, particularly following Ukraine’s unsuccessful counteroffensive in 2023. Since then, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and most Western leaders have acknowledged Russia’s likely retention of control over a significant portion of the occupied territories, while still refusing to formally recognize altered Ukrainian borders.

Shifting Realities and the Debate Over Recognition

The refusal to officially acknowledge Russia’s territorial control stems from arguments concerning the nature of international relations and Ukraine’s future. Opponents of formal recognition contend that territorial integrity is a cornerstone of the post-World War II order, and compromising it could destabilize the entire international system. They also believe that conceding territory would embolden aggressors and that formally relinquishing land equates to Ukrainian capitulation, while continued non-recognition preserves the possibility of future reclamation. However, analysis suggests each of these arguments is flawed.

A Pragmatic Approach to Peace

As part of a lasting peace agreement, it is in the interest of Ukraine, Europe, and the United States to delineate a new international border roughly aligned with the current line of control. This would require both Ukraine and Russia to adjust their constitutional claims to reflect the territory they actually occupy. Ukraine would concede territory within its internationally recognised 1991 borders, while Russia would accept a legitimate border not encompassing unilaterally annexed territories. The agreement could also allow for limited, mutually agreed-upon adjustments to the line of control and a period for residents of affected areas to freely choose their jurisdiction.

The notion that the international order rests on a strong norm against territorial conquest is historically inaccurate. Borders have changed frequently since 1945, often as a result of conquest. A 2020 study by political scientist Dan Altman found that successful territorial conquest has been more common since World War II than in the 1930s and 40s. Examples include Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights in 1967, North Vietnam’s takeover of South Vietnam, and Indonesia’s control of East Timor.

The Current Situation and Future Prospects

In the present case, Ukraine’s territorial integrity has already been breached. Russia has constitutionally annexed Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, fully controlling the first two regions and significant portions of the others. While Russia withdrew from parts of these regions under Ukrainian pressure in the fall of 2022, the balance of power has shifted, with Moscow now holding advantages in manpower and resources that Ukraine struggles to counter due to diminishing Western support. As the war continues, Russia is more likely to gain ground than to lose it. Western non-recognition of Russian territorial expansion will not alter these realities.

non-recognition is unlikely to meaningfully constrain Russian behavior or deter other potential aggressors. The international refusal to recognize Russian control over Crimea did not prevent Putin from invading Ukraine in February 2022. Actions in one part of the world are not strongly correlated with calculations in distant regions. The decision to risk military action is driven by perceived costs, opportunities, and strategic interests, not legal precedent.

The argument that de jure recognition equates to Ukrainian capitulation overlooks the fact that Ukraine has already achieved key objectives, including maintaining its independence and sovereignty and forging closer ties with the European Union. Officially recognizing a new border with Russia would not jeopardize these achievements and could potentially facilitate further Western integration.

The Path Forward

Ukraine’s ability to regain control of its territory does not hinge on whether a new border is legally recognised or accepted de facto. Renegotiation is always possible if the balance of power shifts. The West previously refused to recognize the Soviet Union’s annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940, a policy that yielded no results, while simultaneously recognizing the Soviet status of other republics. Eventually, all 15 republics gained independence peacefully. The primary obstacle to restoring Ukraine’s 1991 territory is Russia’s unwillingness to relinquish its claims and its ability to enforce them, not recognition policies in Kyiv or Western capitals.

officially adjusting the border could offer security benefits. A clearly defined line would facilitate accountability for renewed hostilities, enabling targeted sanctions against Russia and renewed military support for Ukraine in the event of unprovoked aggression. It could also allow for reciprocal troop withdrawals, reducing the risk of escalation.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the current stance of Western leaders regarding recognizing Russia’s control over Ukrainian territory?

Western leaders continue to categorically reject the formal recognition of altered Ukrainian borders, despite acknowledging that Russia will likely retain control over a significant portion of occupied territory.

According to the article, what is a potential benefit of officially recognizing a new border between Russia and Ukraine?

A clearly defined border would facilitate accountability for renewed hostilities, enabling targeted sanctions against Russia and renewed military support for Ukraine in the event of unprovoked aggression.

What historical examples does the article cite to support the argument that international borders frequently change?

The article cites Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights in 1967, North Vietnam’s takeover of South Vietnam, and Indonesia’s control of East Timor as examples of border changes since 1945.

Is a lasting peace in Ukraine contingent on acknowledging the current realities on the ground?